On June 26, Lebanon signed a US-mediated framework agreement with Israel, after months of airstrikes, military incursions, mass displacement, and large-scale destruction. The deal will reportedly usher in a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and the gradual deployment of Lebanon’s armed forces into two pilot zones, where civilians will be allowed to ‘safely’ return’ and reconstruction to commence.

The agreement, however, makes Israeli withdrawal contingent on the ‘verified disarmament’ of Hezbollah, thereby asking an already-strained Lebanese state to build up its own military capacity, while simultaneously confronting Hezbollah, a militarily superior domestic actor.

This framework does not simply open the door to recovery. It risks turning reconstruction into a security-conditioned process in which recovery is tied to staged military and political benchmarks. Collapsed public institutions, a decimated state capacity as well as unanswered question of who will bear the cost of Lebanon’s years long financial crisis, complicate the possibility of recovery.

In Gaza, a similar approach has been proposed by policymakers and the United States and Israel to start with reconstruction in areas within the Israeli-controlled yellow line, but observers have warned that this move would amount to a de-facto partition, solidifying borders not agreed upon in formal negotiations or as part of a diplomatic process. Despite the new realities on the ground and Hamas announcing it will cede administrative control of the Gaza Strip on July 6 2026, the issue of reconstruction continued to be tied to the issue of disarmament by Israel, which at the same time announced an increase in demand for housing near the Gaza border following “the elimination of the threat.”

What is at stake in this distinction is not simply the timing of construction. When assistance is delayed until a disarmament benchmark is met, displacement continues, savings are depleted and livelihoods disappear. Testimonies from southern Lebanon show why eligibility for civilian recovery cannot be subordinated to negotiations over which affected residents have no control.

The Costs of Long-term Displacement

In Al-Tiri village of Bint Jbeil district, close to the border zone with Israel, a family villa once stood on a hillside; pale stone walls, green shutters, arched windows, a red-tiled roof, and a terrace overlooking the surrounding land. According to the owners, the home had been built after 40 years of hard work in the Gulf – a retirement home and monument built at the back of a life spent abroad. Today, the house has been destroyed and reduced to rubble.

Elsewhere, in Mays al-Jabal village of the Marjayoun district – a larger border-area municipality that has long served as a local hub for surrounding villages – one displaced resident laments a broader destruction. Her brother worked in the village hospital, which was bombed. His house was destroyed, forcing him to be displaced to Beirut. Most houses in the village were also destroyed. Trees were burned to the ground. “Everyone is displaced,” she said. “There is no work, no labor, no income.”

When people are displaced to Beirut, many face a painful mismatch between village-based livelihoods and the urban economy. Agricultural labor, local trades, and community-based work do not easily translate into rent, transport costs, and precarious city employment.

The damage is not just personal, it strikes at the economic backbone of the entire region. Villages in South Lebanon are tied to agricultural economies. The region is home to more than half of the country’s citrus trees, and a quarter of its olive groves. Livestock farming, particularly dairy production, supported around 60% of the poorest agricultural households in the South Reconstruction restricted to security-cleared zones would therefore create more than a geographical disparity in housing repairs, by determining which agricultural communities are able to return in time to restore their land, livestock and markets, and which suffer losses that become effectively permanent.

The latest damage assessments provide a conservative estimate of 1.7 billion USD for the total damage costs sustained in just six months across South Lebanon, Beirut, and Mount Lebanon. This does not account for the cumulative damage to physical infrastructure sustained previously.

Following the 2023–2024 round of conflict in Lebanon, the World Bank estimated physical damages at $3.4 billion and $5.1 billion in economic losses across seven key sectors. A later and more comprehensive Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment released in March 2025 estimated the conflict’s total economic cost at $14 billion, including $6.8 billion in physical damages and $7.2 billion in economic losses, with recovery and reconstruction needs estimated at $11 billion. This informed theLebanon Emergency Assistance Project (LEAP), a June 2025 $250 million World Bank-financed response under a scalable $1 billion government-led implementation framework.

Picking Up the Pieces

LEAP creates an immediate institutional test. Will its geographical prioritization follow independently assessed civilian needs, or the security sequencing established by the agreement? This question is further complicated by the intersection between World Bank reconstruction financing and the International Monetary Fund’s macroeconomic framework. While the Bank may finance recovery, IMF-backed measures concerning debt sustainability and public-sector restructuring will shape the resources available to households and public institutions. Security delays and fiscal consolidation could therefore operate together; affected families may remain excluded from reconstruction while continuing to bear the costs of displacement and economic adjustment.

Community-led initiatives have stepped in to provide displaced families with meals, medication, clothing and shelter. But mutual aid should not be romanticized as a substitute for public systems. Its necessity exposes precisely what reconstruction must address, from restoring services, enabling dignified return, protecting land and livelihoods to giving affected communities meaningful influence over decisions about their future.

The Lebanese government does not need another damage-assessment institution. Existing assessments must instead be connected to transparent and enforceable allocation decisions. The Prime Minister’s Office and the Council for Development and Reconstruction should publish the criteria used to translate damage assessments into the geographical sequencing of projects under the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Project and other public reconstruction spending. This should include a village-level record of assessed needs, approved allocations and implementation status.

More importantly, the government should formally guarantee that eligibility will be determined by independently verified damage, displacement and livelihood loss—not by whether a locality lies within a security-cleared pilot zone or has reached a disarmament benchmark. The World Bank and other donors should apply this civilian-needs firewall to existing and additional LEAP financing and support an appeals mechanism through which residents and municipalities can contest omissions from damage registers or project lists.

Lebanese negotiators must also seek written and internationally monitored guarantees of civilian return, reconstruction access and protection from renewed attacks before a final agreement is concluded. These guarantees should apply to all affected localities, including those outside the initial pilot zones.

Security realities may shape when individual projects can safely begin, but they must not determine whether displaced communities possess a right to reconstruction. Without that safeguard, phased recovery could consolidate displacement rather than end it.

By Hussein Cheaito

This article was originally published by Geopolitical Monitor on July 30, 2026, and is republished here with the author’s permission. 

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