CASE STUDY

ASSESSMENT STUDY: THE WORLD BANK IN SUPPORT TO JORDAN’S ACCELERATED EDUCATION SECTOR REFORMS AND RESPONSE TO COVID-19 CRISIS

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Abstract:

This study was developed by the Jordanian Phenix Center for Economics and Informatics and commissioned by the Arab Watch Coalition. The goal of this study is to assess the efficiency of the design and the implementation of the World Bank's funded Education Reform Support Program for Results and the Education Reform Support Program for Results Additional Financing.

The study was based on desk research for the available documents on the World Bank website; studies, research, and reports produced by the Jordanian government, and reputable international organizations on the education system in Jordan. The researcher also interviewed World Bank representatives as well as parents, teachers, and civil society groups.

I. The Education Reform Support Program-for-Results:

In December 2017, the World Bank approved a $200 million loan to the Government of Jordan for Jordan Education Reform Program-for-Results (PforR), in support of the Ministry of Education’s Education Strategic Plan 2018-2022 (ESP). The Program Development objective of Education Reform Support PforR is: “to expand access to early childhood education, and to improve student assessment and teaching and learning conditions for Jordanian children and Syrian refugee children.”

The Jordan Education Reform PforR supports a sub-portion of the public service enterprises (PSE) across four Result Areas, under the theme of access and quality for Early Childhood Education, basic, and secondary education. The first Result Area aims to expand access and improve quality of early childhood education, the second Result Area is to improve the conditions for both teaching and learning, the third Result Area is to reform the student assessment and certification system, and the fourth Result Area is to strengthen education system management. The Key Performance Indicators (KPI) set to monitor and measure the effectiveness of the program include: the number of Jordanian and Syrian refugee children enrolled in KG2, disaggregated by nationality, gender, and type of school (private or public); the percentage point reduction in the dropout rate of Syrian refugees, disaggregated by gender; the number of teachers evaluated against the new National Teacher Professional Standards (NTPS) who meet the minimum qualifications.

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performance standards; and the completion of the first phase of general secondary education certificate examination (Tawjihi) reforms.³

Already before the COVID-19 pandemic, MoE had sought additional financial support for its efforts to achieve educational reform. On June 29, 2020, the World Bank approved the **Jordan Education Reform Support Program-for-Results Additional Financing**. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the arm of the World Bank that lends to the public sector of the middle-income countries) provided a non-concessional⁴ portion of US$81.4 million, with concessional support of US$18.6 million from the Global Concessional Financing Facility - amounting to US$100 million in additional funding for the US$200 million parent program. The approved additional financing was also intended to respond to the Ministry of Education’s response plans for COVID-19 - namely, the Education During Emergency Plan (2020-2022),⁵ which aimed to provide the educational infrastructure for distance and blended learning models and support for students and ensure health and safety standards.⁶ The Jordan Education PforR operation was extended by two years, and was expanded through the creation of new targets, such as the objective to enroll all 5-year-old children in Jordan beginning with the academic year 2020-21. The restructuring of the original JERS PforR, including its extension by 2 years, resulted in a new financing closing date of May 31, 2025.

There are 8 categories of DLIs for the project:

**DLI #1**: Number of Syrian refugee boys and girls enrolled in Target Schools⁷

**DLI #2**: Expansion of KG2 services

**DLI #3**: Improved quality assurance system for KG2 services

**DLI #5**: Improved learning environment in public schools and systemization of socioemotional data collection and reporting

**DLI #6**: Improved physical environment in Jordanian public schools

**DLI #7**: Improved student assessment system

**DLI #8**: Increased availability of resources and tools for the Program

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³ Ibid.

⁴ A non-concessional loan is a loan extended by an international organization to a country, on terms that are more generous than the standard market loan terms. These loans are more relaxed owing to either interest rates lower than the ongoing rate in the market, or by grace periods, or a combination of both. For the purpose of the World Bank’s agreement with Jordan, the “Concessional Portion of the Loan” means the amount of the Loan referred to in Section 2.01(a)(ii) of the Agreement, which has been contributed for the Operation from the “Concessional Financing Facility” (CFF) on a non-reimbursable basis.

⁵ Education During Emergency Plan (2020-2022).


⁸ Program Target Schools are schools that are participating in the Program interventions, including: ECE enrolment, teacher training, socio-emotional learning program, school maintenance, student assessment, etc.
Most significantly, the Additional Financing is intended to support the COVID-19 pandemic response, and particularly to ensure that the response will not further exacerbate existing inequalities. The Additional Financing project document acknowledges that vulnerable Jordanian and Syrian students are likely to have fallen yet further behind in terms of learning outcomes as a result of school closures and the switch to distance education.

II. Assessment and Analysis

II.1 Assessment of the Design of the Program

The project’s financing instrument is Program-for-Results, which links disbursement of funds directly with achievement of results. As such, no withdrawal can be made for any Disbursement Linked Indicator (DLI) “until and unless” Jordan has provided evidence satisfactory to the Bank that the said DLI has been achieved.\(^8\) A third-party Independent Verification Agency verifies the evidence showing the achievement of the DLI.\(^9\) P-for-R operations leverage World Bank financing to assist a government program, in which the P-for-R supports only a part of the government program. Part of the nature of the P-for-R financing instrument is its reliance on the processes of the country and its institutions. However, as this was rated as a “complementary or interdependent project requiring active coordination,”\(^10\) the World Bank’s collaborative efforts are crucial to the success of the operation.

According to a World Bank’s publication, enabling conditions for the successful implementation of an education P-for-R operation rely on a combination of capacity and willingness.\(^11\) The implementing government must be willing to pass-on some of the performance-based incentives inherent in DLIs down to front-line actors who are dealing directly with beneficiaries; otherwise, these DLIs are less likely to impact ultimate results. Thus, it is a point of concern that the DLIs of the Jordan P-for-R do not directly incentivize responsible actors: Impact tends to be limited when DLIs simply disburse to central ministries for results at the school level rather than having DLIs matched with direct incentives to actors. This can be seen through other World Bank funded...

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education P-for-R projects, just as in Tanzania, which included School Incentive Grants (SIG) for performance.\textsuperscript{12}

Moreover, while the Jordan Education Reform P-for-R Additional Financing added a new indicator for the percentage of grievances received through the grievance redress mechanism that are resolved within 21 days (with a target of 80%), issues arise when these complaint mechanisms are inaccessible. The MoE accepts grievances from the nation-wide “Bikhidmitkom” (“at your service”) application, which users say frequently crashes or fails to load, creating additional barriers for complaints to be formally registered.\textsuperscript{13} The MoE grievance redress mechanisms (GRM) are currently inefficient and not widely advertised to stakeholders.\textsuperscript{14} The Protection and Safe Environment Section, which is also not very well known by the students and the public,\textsuperscript{15} maintains a hotline for receiving complaints, as well as accepting complaints within their office. However, the Program Action Plan supports training the GRM unit and supporting a new electronic complaint system, which is a promising and positive change. As indicated by the Implementation Status & Results Report disclosed to the public on March 19th, 2021, the MOE staff has successfully maintained a rapid resolution rate for complaints, with 96% of grievances received through the grievance redress mechanism that are resolved\textsuperscript{16} within 21 days.\textsuperscript{17} This marks an early achievement of one of the indicators for the PDO of strengthening management of the education system in Jordan. However, in order to ensure that the GRMs are effective at receiving and redressing complaints, more focus should be placed on raising public awareness to the existence of the new electronic complaint system and ensuring that it is easy to access.

In response to the uncertainties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Program was designed to accommodate a high degree of flexibility in the implementation of the Program activities. According to World Bank representatives, this flexibility has allowed the MoE to have a higher degree of adaptability in the face of multiple closures after COVID-19 outbreaks at the Ministry. However, this flexibility has also caused delays in activities, such as the construction and improvement of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) facilities at public schools.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Interviews with parents and civil society actors, between Dec. 2020 and Feb. 2021.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{16} As per the Program Paper, “Resolved grievances defined as grievances that were followed up on and forwarded to the responsible entities by the Ministry’s grievance redress mechanism team.”
\end{itemize}
In order to assess the environmental and social risks and benefits of the program restructuring and scale up and engage stakeholders, the World Bank consulted with international development partners and UN agencies including UNICEF, Save the Children, and the Norwegian Refugee Council from December – February 2020.\(^{18}\) However, no local CSOs have been consulted for assessing the stakeholder needs regarding the additional financing for the Jordan Education Reform PforR. This is despite the fact that the World Bank conducted stakeholder consultations in preparation for the Environmental and Social Systems Assessment conducted prior to the approval of the parent Jordan Education Reform PforR in 2017, which included interviews with NGOs and field visits to Jordanian schools.\(^{19}\) The exclusion of local stakeholders from participatory decision-making in the design stages of the program is a missed opportunity for context-based design. The World Bank solely relies on the MoE to reach out to stakeholders during the implementation phase of the operation. Thus, stakeholders with uneasy relationships with governmental authorities - such as the Teachers’ Syndicate, for example - may face increased difficulties in voicing their concerns and needs. The World Bank should be aware of the political context in the country it operates in; in this specific case, the World Bank should have taken additional measures to ensure the sustained engagement of the Teachers’ Syndicate.

Both the parent Jordan Education PforR and the Additional Financing neglect to mention Palestinian students and other students of non-Jordanian nationalities. This is an area of concern, as Palestinian refugees and other children of non-Jordanian nationalities are particularly vulnerable to educational disruptions.\(^{20}\) Children who are refugees from Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq are just as deserving of their right to an education, and as such education reform policy and World Bank financed programs must not overlook their specific needs.

Design flaws in the parent program impacted the early effectiveness of the operation,\(^{21}\) as some indicators were designed without a clear baseline with which to compare achievements. For instance, data on the percentage of Syrian refugee boys and girls dropping out of schools was not clear at the beginning of the Program. According to the most recent Implementation Status and


\(^{21}\) Interviews with representatives of the World Bank and Team Leaders of the Jordan Education Reform Program-for-Results Additional Financing.
Results Report (ISRR) on 19-03-2021, the baseline value for the dropout rate for Syrian refugees is still missing.  

Overall, the design of the Program addressed important concerns which are essential to the reform of the national educational ecosystem of Jordan. However, further inclusion of local actors in the designing phase of the Program may have assisted in painting a fuller and more realistic picture of the challenges and opportunities facing the Program.

II.2 Assessment of the Implementation of the Program

The Ministry of Education (MoE) is the Government’s responsible entity for implementing the program, with the administrative support of the Development Coordination Unit (DCU). As of 19-03-2021, the World Bank has rated the Jordan Education Reform Support Program progress towards achievement of the Program Development Objectives (PDO) and overall Progress as Moderately Satisfactory. There have been some areas of progress towards achieving its objectives. For example, figures from the MOE Education Management Information System (EMIS) show that enrolment of Syrian refugees in Kindergarten 2 (KG2, the year before primary grade 1), basic, and secondary education had increased in 2019, but these figures have not been verified, so that disbursement against the relevant disbursement-linked indicator (DLI1) has not occurred yet. Furthermore, National Teacher Professional Standards have been developed and adopted – representing achievement of disbursement-linked result (DLR) 4.1. Before the dissolution of the Teacher’s Union, work was also underway (with the support of the Teacher’s Union) to develop teacher evaluation tools and reform the teacher career path and to conduct a needs assessment for socio-emotional learning programs in schools. In terms of improving the physical learning environment under RA2, approval of the legal framework for allowing transfer of school-level maintenance and upkeep budget to schools, representing the achievement of DLR6.2. Moreover, under RA3, the grade 3 diagnostic test on early grade reading and math was implemented (DLR7.2) and the MOE has begun reviewing the overall approach to student assessment across all grades, including both national and international assessments. 

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However, the most recent Project Development Objective Indicators highlight some areas of concern. While the target number of teachers evaluated against the new National Teacher Professional Standards (NTPS) who meet the minimum performance standards is 5000 teachers between October 2017 and May 2023, so far there have been zero teachers evaluated. Representatives of the World Bank explained that this is because the NTPS evaluation is still in the development phase, and the COVID-19 pandemic has halted the process of evaluating teachers.26

The first phase of Tawjihi reform has yet to be completed. The World Bank cites the complex nature of the Tawjihi reform measures, as society and stakeholders must be consulted throughout the process of amending the high-stakes nature of the Tawjihi exam.

One indicator of the parent PforR - the reduction of the dropout rate of Syrian refugees by 5% - has been removed as data was unavailable for a base figure to compare progress to. A new indicator now considers the number of Syrian refugee boys and girls benefitting from the PforR Program interventions, disaggregated by gender and level of education. However, some CSOs working on issues related to child and refugee protection expressed concern that online education may lead to an increase in the number of Syrian refugees dropping out of school.

Similarly, while the number of Jordanian children and Syrian refugee children enrolled in KG2 was well on track to meet its 2023 target of 110000 in February, it is apparent that the outbreak of the Coronavirus may have led to reduced numbers of children enrolled in Kindergarten.27 The number of Syrian refugee children enrolled in target schools as reported by MOE in late 2020 (144,044 students), while above the baseline figure of 125,000 in 2017, represents a drop from earlier 2020 estimations. This was due to dropouts during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the drop, overall enrolment of Syrian refugee children in Jordanian schools continues to rise from the baseline figure of 125,000.

The Intermediate Report for the parent P-for-R also showed that some DLIs were not completed by their original deadline, hence the need to extend the program and initiate the Additional Financing:

- No in-service training modules was conducted for KG teachers, no improved maintenance system had been adopted,

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26 Interviews with representatives of the World Bank and Team Leaders of the Jordan Education Reform Program-for-Results Additional Financing.
- MoE has failed to adopt a legal framework for the Tawjihi exam that separates its secondary graduation and certification function from its function as a screening mechanism for university entrance,
- The current percentage of schools with high proportions of Syrian refugees implementing the socioemotional learning program is 0% (the target goal was 70% by 2023),
- No Public-Private Partnership (PPP) setup has been designed and no implementation plan for PPP rollout has been developed,
- Out of a target of 50000, zero K-12 teachers have been trained and certified,
- No teacher feedback on training and certification training has been monitored or included in the annual monitoring and progress reports.

As for the additional financing, no data is currently available on implementation ratings, completion ratings, independent evaluation ratings, or the results framework.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, there are currently gaps in the program design and implementation which need to be monitored and analyzed more closely. The most recent Implementation Status Report, made publicly available on March 19, 2021, indicates a rating of Moderately Satisfactory. Additionally, the World Bank has informed the authors that the MOE and World Bank have been working together over the course of the pandemic on the technical design and logistical preparation of a pilot, which will take place shortly after schools reopen.\textsuperscript{29} School closures have been a large hurdle in terms of achieving the objectives of the JERSP.

According to the World Bank’s Human Capital Index, the expected years of school for a child in Jordan has declined to 11.1 years, compared to 11.6 in 2017 – the year that the Jordan Education Reform Support P-for-R (JERSP) was initially approved.\textsuperscript{30}

### III Assessment of MoE’s COVID-19 Response:

As the Additional Financing was in part approved to assist the MoE’s COVID-19 response efforts, an assessment of the aforementioned part of its COVID-19 response efforts is necessary to fully examine the Program.
The Government of Jordan closed all schools, kindergartens, and universities in mid-March of 2020, impacting 2.37 million learners. On 22 March 2020, MoE announced the launch of Darsak, an online education platform set up to host the new televised lessons for grades 1-12. In early

\textsuperscript{28} World Bank Project Operations, \url{https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P162407}
\textsuperscript{29} Comments from the World Bank, received Sat, Jun 19, 2021.
\textsuperscript{30} Human Capital Index Data Bank, World Bank.
April, ‘Noorspace’, an education management information system, was set up to provide teachers and schools with tools to track attendance, monitor engagement, and set assessments online. These resources covered the curriculum’s core subjects of Arabic, English, math, and science for grades 1 through 12. Jordan’s TV sports channel was also repurposed to broadcast educational material tailored to students preparing for the Tawjihi. The MOE also created a website landing page to host pre-existing teacher professional development programs on technology, offering 90 training hours of training in partnership with Edraak.

Later in 2020, the MoE developed the Education during Emergency Plan 2020/22 (EDEP). The plan lays out the short- to medium-term education response to the COVID-19 pandemic in three phases:

(a) **Response Phase** (March-May 2020) - piloting distance education and providing a web-based platform
(b) **Recovery/Remedial Phase** (June-August 2020) – a month-long catch-up program prior to the beginning of the new school year in September 2020 addressing learning gaps for those who were unable to access TV or the internet, MOE plans to provide and preparing during this phase for the return of students, including ensuring minimum required health and safety measures
(c) **Sustainability Phase** (September 2020-September 2022) – Offering a blended learning model, with online education as an additional resource for students

Furthermore, the EDEP plan “[...]recognizes the likely learning gap emerging from the reliance on distance education, especially for students from vulnerable and disadvantaged backgrounds (including Syrian refugees) and foresees a month-long catch-up program prior to the beginning of the new school year in September 2020. [...] Similar to the original PforR, World Bank management has approved an exceptional increase in the AF advance limit from 25 to 40 percent to provide the government with the required funds for the safe reopening of schools, amongst other key priorities.” (Emphasis added.)

In August, MoE announced instructions for schools regarding wearing face masks and implementing other precautionary measures. These instructions included regulations requiring schools to implement policies regarding hygiene practices, physical distancing, wearing face masks, and stressed the need to “seriously consider the current epidemiological situation while

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31 UNICEF, 2020, [https://inee.org/system/files/resources/0.pdf](https://inee.org/system/files/resources/0.pdf)
considering the increase in numbers of the local virus cases when applying precautionary measures and committing to them.”

However, a year later, the MoE has not moved past the Response Phase of the plan. An interview with an employee of the Ministry of Education in late December of 2020 revealed that plans for the recovery/remedial phase of the plan - which involves revision for students who have missed learning material during the distanced learning period - are currently being made with the goal of having it available by the end of February.

On January 12th, 2021, King Abdallah the Second directed the government to reopen schools safely, in a way that will “protect both citizens and the Jordanian economy.” It was not immediately clear when the King's directive would take effect. Even though the MoE has published a plan for the return of students to school in September of 2020, there is a large air of uncertainty and trepidation regarding what this return will look like on the ground. The MOE later announced that students will return to schools during the second semester with a staggered approach, and students returned starting February 7, 2021 on an alternative basis with a maximum class capacity of 15-20 students. However, due to the rising number of cases, the MOE has withdrawn this decision and has provided no information on when a safe return to schools will take place.

As of now, thousands of students still do not have access to this educational content, due to unreliable internet connections, lack of smartphones or laptops, or other challenges faced at home. Over 16% of students in Jordan lack internet access, while 33% lack a computer that can be used for schoolwork. This digital gap is found mostly in low-income households, with over two-thirds of students from the lowest economic status groups reporting that they don’t have a laptop they can use for school and one in every two lacking access to the internet. Thus, there is a valid reason for concern that the COVID-19 pandemic may be exacerbating educational inequalities between children from wealthier backgrounds (whose parents can afford private schools, tutors, faster Wi-Fi connections, and electronic devices such as laptops rather than phones), and children whose families are struggling to make ends meet. This online education


36 Shahzadeh, Yasmine, & Dina Batshon. “Education in the Time of COVID-19: Reflecting on Responses and Short Term Priorities in Jordan.” Centre for Education and International Development (CEID), UCL Institute of Education, blogs.ucl.ac.uk/ceid/2020/05/05/batshon-shahzadeh/

gap may be particularly disadvantageous to rural children, refugee children, children with disabilities, and children who underperform in school.

In October 2020, a source in the Ministry of Education reported that approximately 94,000 students who are registered for the general examination of the general secondary school certificate (the Tawjihi) in 2020 are unable to attend video classes that are broadcast through the e-learning platform “Darsak” as they were no longer formally registered students. 38

Additionally, according to reports by the Minister of Education, 11.5% of students in Jordan had failed to sign up for the Darsak e-learning platform by the beginning of the 2019-2020 school year.39 Of the students who did sign up, 38% of students did not regularly attend online classes, with only 62% of students accessing Darsak on a daily basis.40 18% of students did not log in to take their final exams via the online learning platform.41 In April of 2021, the Ministry released a statement that an estimated 100,000 students have not engaged in remote education.42

The daily student attendance rate fell to just 49% for the first semester of the 2020-2021 school year. The daily attendance rate was higher for students in Grade 1, with 63% of first graders attending their classes remotely every day. For students at a secondary education level (Grade 11 and 12), the percentage of students attending online classes through the Darsak platform was just 37%.43 44

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38 Ministry of Education sources, as cited in https://alghad.com/%D8%AA%D9%83%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%AC%D9%A9%87%D9%8A-94-%D8%A3%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%B7%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A8-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%85%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%86/

39 According to the Minister of the Ministry of Education, as quoted on the 24th of November in: https://samajordan.com/news/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-38-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A6%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%88-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%83-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7

40 According to the Minister of the Ministry of Education, as quoted on the 24th of November in: https://www.assawsana.com/portal/pages.php?newsid=485805

41 The Minister of Education, as quoted in: https://www.sawaleif.com/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BD%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B5%D8%A9-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%83-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A7


43 Data provided by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Education for Administrative and Financial Affairs, Dr. Najwa Qubeilat, in February of 2021.

MoE’s cavalier attitude regarding the failures of the Darsak is even more alarming, indicating an unwillingness to re-examine its policies. In November, the Minister of Education Tayseer Al-Nuaimi said the online education platform "Darsak Two" now caters to all students and grants them access ... materials and lessons, unlike "Darsak One" which had only provided basic materials. In an interview in December, he remarked that MoE was satisfied with the institutional structures for online learning in Jordan, adding that the number of students that have logged into Darsak has reached 91% - which leaves approximately 180,000 of Jordan’s 2 million students who have yet to even log into the e-learning platform even once.

The UNHCR reported that 25% of households with children who responded to its Socio-Economic Assessment of Children and Youth in the Time of COVID-19 stated that their children are not accessing the Darsak e-learning platform. When asked why children are not accessing Darsak, 50% of respondents reported that they did not have enough internet access, while just 16% reported that children watched televised lessons. Male-headed households (25%), Jordanians (29%), host/out of camps (26%), and smaller households (30%) were more likely to report that their children were not accessing Darsak. According to the UNHCR, camp populations do not appear to have greater access to remote learning than urban populations - however, camps such as Za’atari are often better serviced than urban populations. 84% of Syrian refugees live in urban areas rather than in refugee camps, leaving them more vulnerable to being underserviced. The closure of pre-schools, schools and universities and switch to online platforms has led to uneven learning disruptions: one joint study by the United Nations Populations Fund and Plan International showed that 88% of adolescent girls and boys shared that they are pursuing a form of remote learning. Jordanian boys and girls report higher levels of remote learning than Syrians. The small number of refugees from other nationalities reported high levels of access, while Palestinians reported the lowest levels of access at 50%. Overall, these numbers indicate that the Darsak e-learning platform has failed in its mission to ensure the digital gap does not further exacerbate the learning gap across socioeconomic levels and for Syrian refugees, particularly who are living in urban areas rather than camps.

46 Statement by Minister of Education Tayseer Al-Nuaimi. See: https://royanews.tv/news/232119
Moreover, MoE’s strategy of continuing to rely on distance learning instead of considering alternatives such as a safe return to school is concerning considering the high economic and social consequences that school closures have meant for the Jordanian community. More puzzlingly, MoE’s strategy of providing only distance learning measures rather than a hybrid approach to education goes against the recommendations of UNICEF and the WHO.\(^1\) Despite the Ministry’s Education During Emergency Plan 2020/22 (EDEP) describing the switch to distance education as a short-term solution, with plans for the medium term including safe and distanced return to school, schools in Jordan continue to be closed. MoE’s agreement with the World Bank clearly states that the additional financing is intended to support efforts for a safe return to in-person education and a hybrid learning system, which states that MoE sees benefits in integrating distance education into traditional classroom instruction. The EDEP stated that the MoE is “fully aligned with the international direction on preparing for and sustaining safe school reopening.”\(^2\)

The Program Information Documents (PID) state that “the education system in Jordan will not only recover but “build back better” during this phase, with MoE exploring opportunities to leverage high-quality distance learning content as a complementary resource for students during regular times and piloting blended learning modalities.”\(^3\) However, this state of limbo in which students, parents, and teachers have no idea when a return to traditional classroom instruction is not providing a foundation for improving educational outcomes in Jordan. On the contrary: despite the pledges made by the Jordanian government, students who are less privileged are being left behind.

To directly quote the EDEP: “The longer marginalized children are out of school, the less likely they are to return. Prolonged closures disrupt essential school-based services such as school feeding and psychosocial support and can cause stress and anxiety due to the loss of peer interaction and disrupted routines. These negative impacts will be significantly higher for marginalized children, refugees, and children with disabilities.” While the technical innovations for online learning offer a path to students to continue their education during school closures, they can only reach those that have internet connectivity, and adequate data appropriate devices.

COVID-19 may also have a particularly harmful impact on girls’ education, which may lead to exacerbated gender inequalities in the long-term. An opinion survey of Jordanians focusing on


the impact of COVID-19 on Jordanian families found that 85% of respondents agreed that the lockdown has led to an increase in household burdens for Jordanian women and girls. 54 55% of adolescent girls report that they and their peers are doing more household chores during lockdown. Girls are also disproportionately taking on the care of younger children in the household and helping them with their studies, leaving less time for their own studies. 55 Furthermore, data on child marriage in previous pandemics (such as Ebola) indicates concerns that COVID-19 could lead to an increase in child marriage. 56 School closures put girls at a higher risk of child marriage. 57 However, the gendered implications of school closures are not just harmful for girls: boys are more likely to skip school, more likely to drop out, and more likely to be recruited into child labor. Research shows that school closures are associated with increased levels of child labor. 58 Although the impact of COVID-19 school closures on child labor and dropout rates is yet to be documented, data shows that prolonged closures because of previous pandemics (such as the Ebola pandemic) led to increased dropout rates, with the poorest households witnessing the largest increase in dropout rates. 59

COVID-19 may also have a harmful impact on teachers, both in private and public schools, who are also stakeholders in educational programs financed by the World Bank in Jordan. Teachers in Jordan have repeatedly gone on strike in the past few years, aiming to secure better wages, pensions, and working conditions. The COVID-19 crisis has adversely impacted their ability to negotiate their contracts, as restrictions against public gatherings of 20 people or more have diminished their collective organization. On July 25th, Human Rights Watch reported that police raided the Jordan Teachers’ Syndicate headquarters in Amman and 11 of its branches across the country, shuttered them, and arrested all 13 syndicate board members after Attorney General Hassan Abdallat issued the order to close the labor union for a period of two years after high-profile disputes between the Jordanian government and the Teachers Syndicate. 60 The 140,000-strong Jordan Teachers’ Syndicate led the most disruptive public sector strike Jordan had ever seen in 2019, which ended a month after it began only after the Jordanian government agreed

to a pay hike.\textsuperscript{61} A report by the UN stated: “The government closed the labor union in July in an act of retaliation because the Teachers Syndicate criticized it for not honoring a 2019 pledge for better pay and conditions that its 140,000 members won after a four-week strike in September 2019.”\textsuperscript{62} In an interview with Phenix Center, the Vice President of the Teachers’ Syndicate, Nasser Nawasrah confirmed that teachers arrested after a protest in February of 2021 were only released after signing legal undertakings which restricted their freedom of speech. Furthermore, he noted that the protests were not only tied to disputes over wages and pensions, but rather due to the Ministry of Education’s failure to abide by its 2019 agreement with the teachers.\textsuperscript{63} On the 13th of December, 2020, the Ministry of Education referred a number of teachers to the Early Retirement Program, including the Vice President of the Teachers’ Syndicate, Nasser Nawasrah, members of the Syndicate Council, Ghalib Abu Qadis and Kafah Abu Farhan, and the official Media Spokesperson for Teachers’ Syndicate, Nouraldin Nadim.

Representatives of the World Bank declined to comment on the Jordanian government’s illegal closure of the Teachers’ Syndicate and declined to comment on the accusations by local CSOs that prolonged schools’ closure was a union-busting tactic to weaken the Teachers’ Syndicate. The refusal of the Jordanian government to provide permits for peaceful protests, as well as the fact that the Defense Orders have banned public gatherings for 20 people or more, has limited opportunities for organization and restricted the freedom of assembly for unionists across the country. If teachers are denied the right to collective bargaining and representation, it will become more difficult to implement program activities to improve learning and teaching conditions. The presence of an active and widely recognized teachers’ association is important to improve teaching conditions and teachers’ training - including training for health and safety measures. Furthermore, if teacher conditions are unsuitable, this could have ripple effects on students’ ability to learn.

A damning report on working conditions for Jordanian private school teachers during COVID-19 showed that 83% of respondents were being paid wages under the minimum wage, 78% worked over 12 hours at a time without receiving extra pay, and 100% were working longer hours compared to the hours they worked in classrooms.\textsuperscript{64} Among the report’s findings was that the majority of teachers said that online teaching is not as productive as standard teaching, with two major constraints being a lack of student and teacher skill in electronics and educational


\textsuperscript{63} Interview with the Vice President of the Teachers’ Syndicate, Nasser Nawasrah, in February 2021.

platforms as well as poor internet connections. While the sample size of 23 teachers across the Kingdom cannot be described as truly representative, it presents an indicator of common issues facing teachers during COVID-19.

Additionally, public school teachers have been severely impacted by the measures taken by the Jordanian government in response to the COVID-19 crisis. The education sector, which employs around 160,000 public sector teachers, is by far the biggest public employer. The Jordanian government has suspended all wage increases until 2021 for all public sector employees while deducting 10% from salaries exceeding JOD 2000 per month as a contribution to the Treasury. Educators in Jordan, over 70% of whom are female, suffer from low wages that have driven teacher strikes and social unrest. The suspension of schooling has only added more uncertainty to the academic year, as the government elected to retract its 2019 agreement with the Teachers’ Syndicate to increase teacher salaries.

IV. Civil Society Response to MoE COVID-19 Strategy

There have been numerous campaigns advocating for the recommencement of in-person education, indicating that measures implemented by MoE concerning online education have been controversial. On social media such as Facebook, one such initiative - titled “My Right to Learn in My School ... No to Suspending Schools” - has gathered over 61,000 members since being launched in late October. A statement by the founder of the online campaign, Aseel Jallad, read that “the experience of the second 2019-2020 semester and the current 2020-2021 semester has proven that online learning is ineffective.” In November, parents chanted “no to distance education,” “no to suspending school attendance,” “give parents the right to choose” and “my right to learn in my classroom” at protests staged both online and on the ground. More recently, over thirty CSOs and hundreds of concerned individuals in Jordan have collaborated on a campaign to lobby for a change in current education measures, which have shut down schools. The “National Campaign for the Return to Schools” has made demands for the resumption of in-class education, calling for a “gradual, immediate and safe return of school students” and advocating for the right of parents and children to choose either between distance learning or

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in-class education.\textsuperscript{67} Organizational members of this movement include the National Council for Family Affairs, Justice Center for Legal Aid, SOS Children’s Village, Save the Children Jordan, among others in the fields of health, education, and child protection. This coalition conducted a survey with parents and students, revealing that 81\% of parents felt that their children’s education has been negatively impacted by school closures.

These CSOs have reported that they have monitored a “worrying” impact of the government decision on Jordan’s children in academic, health, psychological, social and developmental terms. Moreover, a joint statement released expressed a concern that distance learning in Jordan was unable to guarantee all children the right to equitable access to learning resources regardless of their economic or family circumstances.

Save the Children Jordan issued a statement, in which it said: “The government’s decision to close nurseries and schools is a challenge to all children, especially the younger ones, in light of the importance of early education that ensures children improve their capabilities, release their energies and boost their mental growth.”\textsuperscript{68} As part of UNESCO’s COVID-19 education response, a report titled “Adverse consequences of school closures” has highlighted the social and economic costs of the closures, which include; interrupted learning, poor nutrition, confusion and stress for teachers, economic consequences for the lack of available childcare, and parental unprepared for distance and homeschooling.\textsuperscript{69}

V. Impacts on Stakeholders

As mentioned above, the main stakeholders, who are either playing a critical role in the implementation of this program or are directly benefiting from and/or impacted by it, were not consulted during the design of the program, nor were they engaged during its implementation. Here is a list of the main categories of those stakeholders and how this program impacts them.

- **Teachers** have been negatively impacted by online learning, as well as by other measures taken during the COVID-19 crisis which have limited their freedom of association and expression. Teachers in Jordan were not sufficiently equipped to

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\textsuperscript{67} Back to School Jordan. “The National Campaign for Going Back to Schools # Towards a Safe Return to Our Schools.” Change.org, Dec. 20 2020, https://www.change.org/p/%D9%88%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%88-%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A2%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%86%D8%A7?recruiter=157830485&utm_campaign=signature_request&fbclid=IwAR2zKge7_tdrQAAtv9y3TxuxrMKtVX6UMwto7-lxZ6pxLAzRugDSArey0MU&use_react=false

\textsuperscript{68} https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P162407

\textsuperscript{69} UNESCO. “Adverse consequences of school closures.” https://en.unesco.org/covid19/educationresponse/consequences
handle the transition to distance learning and are working longer and unpaid hours to make up the difference for students. Furthermore, the regime’s crackdown on their union should have alerted the World Bank to adopt special measures to ensure their proper engagement.

- **Parents** have been negatively impacted, particularly mothers, upon whom most of the burden of childcare falls. The closures of schools have limited mothers’ employment opportunities at a time where families have lost access to income-generating activities and where poverty rates are increasing. Parents were also not sufficiently equipped to handle the transition to distance learning and homeschooling.

- **Students** have been negatively impacted.
  - Children with disabilities are facing additional challenges in benefiting from online education.
  - Children from low-income families are being thrust into deeper levels of learning poverty due to the technological gap, and are at higher risk of dropping out, falling behind academically, and being subjected to child marriage, child, labor, and other forms of child abuse.
  - Refugee children are less likely to be able to access distance learning programs and platforms, with children in Palestinian refugee camps being particularly at risk.
VI. Recommendations

- The World Bank and the Jordanian government must ensure greater involvement and participatory decision-making of local stakeholders and CSOs (including the Teachers’ Syndicate, parents’ associations, student unions, etc) in both the policymaking and implementing measures.
- The design and implementation of projects must prioritize transparency and accountability. The implementing agencies must be responsible for more regular reports on the progression of the project.
- The design of programs must be inclusive and consider the needs and risks for all stakeholders. The Jordan Education Program must consider the educational outcomes of Palestinian students and other non-Jordanian and non-Syrian nationalities. Moreover, the needs of students with disabilities must not be an afterthought; distance learning should represent an opportunity to achieve more inclusive education, rather than less.
- The Ministry of Education should ensure the safe and transparent reopening of nurseries, kindergartens and schools, while committing to the preventive measures of the Health Ministry as well as the Framework for Reopening Schools announced by UNESCO, the World Health Organisation and UNICEF.
- Jordan must allow teachers the human right to the freedom of association and freedom of expression. The World Bank, in turn, has a moral responsibility to ensure that stakeholders are treated fairly and to speak out against behavior by the implementing agency which is in violation of international standards for human rights and civil liberties.

End of report.
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